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As co-editors of the newsletter, it is with a deep sense 
of sadness that we announce the death of the Black 
philosopher Kenneth Allen Taylor (1954–2019), the Henry 
Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford 
University. From 2001 to 2009, Taylor was the chair of 
Stanford’s philosophy department. He was the first African 
American to chair a philosophy department at an Ivy League 
institution. While individuals such as Alain Locke, Eugene 
Holmes, Richard McKinney, Thomas Freeman, Jesse 
Taylor, Samuel W. Williams, and Francis A. Thomas served 
as chairs of philosophy departments, few had reached 
the heights that Taylor had. Since 2005, Taylor co-hosted 
a national syndicated radio show/podcast Philosophy Talk 
with John Perry. After serving as chair, Taylor became the 
director of the Symbolic Systems Program at Stanford, 
which blends computer science, psychology, linguistics, 
and philosophy, in a “study of the mind.” Taylor’s body 
of work, mainly in the fields of philosophy of language 
and philosophy of mind, include three books: Truth and 
Meaning: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language; 
Reference and the Rational Mind; and Meaning Diminished: 
Toward Metaphysically Modest Semantics. While Taylor 
wrote relatively little that was immediately connected to 
the philosophy of the Black experience, we should not take 
it to mean that he didn’t have determinate views on the 
philosophy of the Black experience. One of the co-editors 
(Ferguson) remembers a spirited discussion I had with 
Taylor in April of 2019 while visiting at Stanford University. 
Taylor and I went back and forth for about forty minutes 
about whether race was metaphysically real. Taylor was a 
defender of Anthony Appiah’s Argument from Illusion or 
racial eliminativist argument; Appiah was coincidently 
at Stanford—only a few tables away—when we were 
engaged in our spirited conversation. After our discussion, 
I remember his wife, Claire Yoshida, saying to me, “I’m 
glad you are challenging him on his views about race and 
racism.” She further explained that their son, Kiyoshi Taylor, 
had also been raising questions about the validity and 
veracity of Ken’s views on race and racism. We hope in the 
future to dedicate an issue to Taylor’s philosophical legacy. 
If anyone is interested in contributing an article on Taylor’s 
philosophical contribution, please contact either myself or 
Dwayne Tunstall.
For this issue, we begin with our annual “Footnotes to 
History” spotlighting Joyce Mitchell Cook—the first African 
American woman professional philosopher—who passed 
away in 2014. Next, we have a contribution from Anwar 
Uhuru (Monmouth University). Uhuru’s essay-review of 
Anthony Neal’s 2019 book Howard Thurman’s Philosophical 
Mysticism: Love against Fragmentation explores Neal’s 
reading of Thurman’s philosophical mysticism and its 
place in African American philosophical history. Next, 
we have a philosophical dialogue between Michael L. 
Thomas and Alfred Frankowsi on the relationship between 
lynching, extra-State violence and genocide. And our last 
contributor, Dr. Leonard Harris, is, of course, no stranger 
to us; he is a former editor and book review editor of 
our newsletter. Harris’s article, “Purdue University and 
President Mitch Daniels: Confession of a Rare Creature,” 
offers “philosophical musings” about what it means to be a 
Black philosopher in the academic world in the twenty-first 
century.
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And while at Yale working on her doctorate, Cook studied 
with a range of well-known philosophers such as Wilfrid 
Sellars, F. S. C. Northrop, Rulon Wells, John Smith, and Paul 
Weiss.
Her dissertation focused on the American philosopher 
Stephen C. Pepper’s Theory of Value. Yancy explains: “It 
was Wilfrid Sellars who assisted Cook in formulating her 
dissertation prospectus before he left Yale to teach at the 
University of Pittsburgh, and then Paul Weiss stepped in 
as Cook’s dissertation director. In the end, however, it was 
under the directorship of philosopher Rulon Wells that 
Cook wrote and completed her dissertation.”1
In 1966 she began teaching in the philosophy department 
at the “Capstone of Negro Education,” Howard University. 
The distinguished historian David Levering Lewis notes 
that Howard and Harvard were the most misogynistic 
universities in the country.2
Cook also taught for one year at Wellesley College (1961-
1962) and two years at Connecticut College (1968–1970). 
In terms of other work experience, for about a year and 
a half, Cook worked for the State Department, where she 
worked as an analyst covering the affairs of various African 
countries. After leaving the State Department, she worked 
for the now defunct Office of Economic Opportunity. 
She left governmental work in 1966 to pursue a career in 
academia. 
In the early 1970s, during the formative historical period 
when only a small number of Black philosophers were 
working on the conceptual parameters of what constitutes 
the field of Black philosophy, Cook was actively involved in 
a number of significant panels and conference discussions 
dedicated toward that end. This is paradoxical given 
Cook’s tendency towards what Yancy describes as a “race 
transcending cosmopolitan spirit.” In November of 1970, at 
a conference on philosophy and the Black experience, at 
the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Cook delivered 
a paper entitled “A Critique of Black Experience.” Later, in 
February of 1976, at the John A. Johnson Foundation in 
Madison Wisconsin, Cook, along with Black philosophers 
William R. Jones and Robert C. Williams, engaged in an 
extensive and insightful conversation about the nature of 
Black philosophy.3
Unfortunately, Cook was denied tenure at Howard 
University. Under the dark cloud of racism and sexism, 
many of the early Black women philosophers face 
unbelievable hardships. As Anita Allen observes: “Angela 
Davis was unlawfully fired by the University of California, 
Los Angeles, in 1970 for her radical politics; Joyce Mitchell 
Cook was denied tenure at Howard University, a historically 
black institution. LaVerne Shelton, now an inspiring poet, 
was denied tenure at Rutgers University and left academia 
in 1996. Adrian Piper, who got her PhD the same year I got 
mine, was denied tenure at the University of Michigan, and 
after a series of other good jobs in philosophy, continued to 
an enormously successful international career as an artist.”4 
After being denied tenure, Cook worked for four years 
(1977–1981) at the White House under President Jimmy 
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FOOTNOTES TO HISTORY
Joyce Mitchell Cook (1933–2014)
Until the recent explosion of Black women professional 
philosophers, there were relatively few women in the 
field. There are the well-known names such as Anita Allen, 
Angela Davis, and Joy James. But before these women, 
there was Joyce Mitchell Cook. In 1965, after receiving 
her doctorate from Yale University, Cook became the 
first African American female professional philosopher. 
This was the same year that Malcolm X was assassinated 
at Manhattan’s Audubon Ballroom. Cook’s road was not 
an easy one—given the vampire of sexism at Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in addition to 
predominantly white universities and colleges.
Cook was born on October 28, 1933, in Sharon, Pennsylvania, 
and died on June 6, 2014. She was the ninth of twelve 
children of Reverend Isaac William Mitchell, Sr., and Mary 
Belle Christman. According to a recently published essay 
by George Yancy, her father was affiliated with the Church 
of God (Anderson, Indiana)—a non-denominational sect of 
the “holiness Christian movement” with roots in Wesleyan 
pietism and also in the restorationist traditions.
After graduating from high school, Cook attended Bryn 
Mawr College. She graduated from Bryn Mawr in 1955 with 
a degree in philosophy. [It is worth noting that in 1940 
the Asian-American activist and philosopher Grace Lee 
(Boggs) received her doctorate from Bryn Mawr.] Cook later 
received a bachelor’s and master’s degree from Oxford 
University in 1957 and 1961, respectively, with a double 
major in psychology and philosophy. While at Oxford, she 
became acquainted with some of the prominent analytical 
philosophers of her day. She studied with renowned 
philosopher Peter Strawson, attended lectures by John 
Austin, and was tutored by Mary Warnock and B. A. Farrell. 
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Culture (NMAAHC). https://youtu.be/Th0jdRPZcVE Last accessed: 
March 1, 2020.
3. For a fuller discussion of the significance of this meeting, see 
John H. McClendon III and Stephen C. Ferguson II, African 
American Philosophers and Philosophy: An Introduction to 
the History, Concepts, and Contemporary Issues (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2019), 93–117.
4. George Yancy, “The Pain and Promise of Black Women in 
Philosophy: Interview with Anita L. Allen,” New York Times June 
18, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/opinion/black-
women-in-philosophy.html Last accessed: March 25, 2020. 
5. George Yancy, “Joyce Mitchell Cook,” 106.
ARTICLES
Textual Mysticism: Reading the Sublime in 
Philosophical Mysticism
Review Essay: Anthony Neal, Howard Thurman’s 
Philosophical Mysticism: Love against Fragmentation 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2019).
Anwar Uhuru
MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY
I would like to begin this essay with a quote by philosopher 
Blanche Radford-Curry. She states, “philosophers should 
not acquire analytic or linguistic skills for their own sake, 
but as a means for solving existential problems to make 
life more worth living.”1 Making life more worth living is 
what I believe is Anthony Neal’s intervention and reason 
for reading Howard Thurman. Neal’s book is not a mere 
attempt to intervene; it actually does the work. His book 
Howard Thurman’s Philosophical Mysticism: Love against 
Fragmentation goes beyond the intersections of time (the 
historical timeline of Thurman’s writings) and disciplinary 
boundaries.2 The goal of this essay is to critically read 
Anthony Neal’s work as a case for critically reading 
mysticism, and why it matters in Africana philosophy. 
My response to Neal’s reading of Thurman answers the 
question: Why should we read it? We should read it because, 
as I argue, not only is Neal arguing for the imperative to 
read philosophical mysticism and the contributions of 
Africana philosophers in the field of mysticism, but also 
how that work is a contemplation of what is the sublime. 
For Neal reads Thurman’s take on the sublime as not being 
just a mere moment of ecstasy, abundance, and bliss, but it 
is achieved when reading and engaging with texts. I would 
argue that in Africana philosophy and the way Neal reads 
Thurman is that the sublime is achieved when reading and 
engaging with texts. Hence those moments of engagement 
while reading, thinking, and responding are what I call 
textual mysticism.3
Currently, scholars working in Afro-Diasporic thought 
and intellectual history are working through the ideas 
of recovery4 and re-memory.5 The work of recovery is 
what scholars in Africana Intellectual History are working 
through and at the same time abiding by and honoring the 
limitations of fragments and missing histories of people 
of African descent. Yet, working to rewrite histories and 
narratives that go against the dominant approach, which is 
Carter as a speech writer and correspondence editor.
George Yancy has noted: “Cook, while not participating 
in the sphere of professional philosophy, had never 
abandoned philosophy. Philosophy was her vocation, her 
calling. She was brilliant, a prolific reader and possessed 
a remarkable memory for details. Her knowledge of the 
history of western philosophy was impressive in its breadth 
and depth.”5 
Ironically, she received the 2004 Alain Locke Excellence 
Award in Africana Philosophy presented at Howard 
University. I say ironically because Locke (who was also 
gay) was one of the most misogynistic men of his era.
Yancy reports that Cook was an avid pianist and loved the 
work of Frederic Chopin.
Her general areas of expertise were value theory and social 
and political philosophy. At the time of her death, she had 
been working on a manuscript on the concept of the Black 
experience.
When the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers was 
formed in 2007, Cook was honored for her contribution 
to the advancement of Black women in the discipline of 
philosophy. However, the recognition of Cook’s contribution 
has not resulted in any articles or books discussing her 
philosophical legacy or contribution. George Yancy, who is 
the executor over her books collection in addition to her 
published and unpublished papers, is the only person to 
have written about her.
SELECTED WORKS BY OR ABOUT JOYCE 
MITCHELL COOK
George Yancy. “Joyce Mitchell Cook: Autobiographical and 
Philosophical Fragments.” Western Journal of Black Studies 
41, nos. 3-4 (2017): 105–18.
Joyce Mitchell Cook. “The Nature and Nurture of 
Intelligence.” The Philosophical Forum 9, nos. 2-3 (1977-
1978): 289–302.
“Joyce Mitchell Cook.” In African-American Philosophers: 
17 Conversations, 263–86. New York: Routledge, 1998.
Joyce Mitchell Cook. “Black Scholars in Philosophy.” A 
Panel of Black philosophers in a radio broadcast sponsored 
by the Johnson Foundation. Wisconsin, February 1976.
Joyce Mitchell Cook. A Critical Examination of Stephen C. 
Pepper’s Theory of Value. Diss., Yale University, 1965.
NOTES
1. George Yancy, “Joyce Mitchell Cook: Autobiographical and 
Philosophical Fragments,” Western Journal of Black Studies 41, 
nos. 3-4 (2017): 110.
2. See David Levering Lewis, “Internationalization of African 
American Politics and Culture (African American Past, Session 6),” 
National Museum of American History, Washington, DC, May 21, 
2016. It was part of the Future of the African American Past co-
sponsored by the American Historical Association (AHA) and the 
Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE
PAGE 4 SPRING 2020  |  VOLUME 19  |  NUMBER 2
and ends with slavery. Yet, Neal sees Howard Thurman’s 
grandmother Nancy as the absolute point of origin on how 
Thurman philosophisizes but also proves that Blackness is 
before and after being enslaved. The discourse on theology 
and mysticism is removed from the period as being both a 
philosophical guide and strategy that informs thought and 
ideologies. Instead, discourse on theological and mystic 
approaches are relegated outside of the movement and are 
siloed to thinkers such as Kierkegaard,11 Weil,12 and Stein.13 
How does mysticism from the perspective of a non-
Catholic and non-white thinker inform philosophy but, 
more importantly, inform others? As Neal claims, “I have 
no intention of placing all of Thurman’s events on a canvas, 
presenting but never firmly establishing justifications for 
texture, tone, and scheme. I am a philosopher.”14 Instead of 
a biographical or a mere insertion of a non-white theologian 
in the canon of mystics, Neal’s work is a hermeneutic 
undertaking in which he reads Thurman as a philosopher. 
Yet, he cannot ignore Thurman’s Blackness. I argue that Neal 
purposes what I call “textual mysticism” as his inclusion 
of the hermeneutic and the mystical. Textual mysticism 
is the transformative process in which a person engages 
with texts as a process to obtain enlightened bliss. Yet, for 
Thurman, his bliss is not just from nor is textual mysticism 
obtained from printed texts. It is the sonic and oral texts 
that Thurman and Black philosophers encounter. What 
better way to grapple with the experiential than by reading 
the mystical? How can our experiences challenge how we 
live in the world? By thinking through those experiences of 
living in the world, who better to philosophize than a Black 
American who, as Neal notes, is “a thinker who has some 
religious, some poetic, and some philosophical works”?15
One cannot begin to philosophize the Black experience 
without those three elements: the poetic, which I argue 
is the personal; the religious, which I argue is humanity’s 
attempt at explaining the unexplainable; and philosophy as 
a set of ideas that are used to conceptualize the self and 
society. Neal further notes, 
when forming frameworks and contextualizations, I have 
ignored the words of those who could only speak about 
blackness as other, and not as self. What could I say about 
the experience of being white without first having someone 
else who experiences it.16 
I would add that this is from the vantage point or 
perspective of seeing but not knowing through experiential 
ties. Thinking about Blackness as the site and genesis of 
thought and not as the problem is already an anti-racist 
and Black-affirming methodology, partially because 
Neal doesn’t philosophize from the perspective of 
contexualizing and correcting the Western Canon. However, 
in placing Blackness of embodiment and philosophizing, it 
is necessary to acknowledge the influence in its duality, 
which is the positive and negative impact that white 
philosophers have on African American philosophy and the 
way that African Americans philosophize. During his time at 
Columbia University, Thurman was able to experience the 
impact that John Dewey had on the department and the 
ways philosophers approached how they philosophized. 
Neal notes, 
to paint people of African descent as victims, dispossessed, 
and melancholic, to portray them instead as survivors and 
thriving against those odds. 6 I borrow Toni Morrison’s term 
of re-memory, but I expound on that concept because 
to remember is a protest of whiteness that forces those 
who are racially and historically marginalized to forget. 
What Morrison and I would agree on is that memory is 
uncomfortable, disruptive, and forces those who benefit 
from “forgetting” to reckon with that memory and do the 
work to repair. In thinking about recovery and re-memory it 
is revisiting moments in history that have become canonical 
and hyper-formulaic. Consequently, that methodology of 
thinking has created a narrative of erasure and excuse. 
Erasure of the complexity of Black life before, during, and 
after the Third Wave of the Civil Rights Movement—the first 
being 1866, the second being 1875, the third 1964, and 
fourth 1968.7 Prior to this moment in political legislative 
victory for Black/African Americans, we only had the 
philosophical contribution of Alain Locke. He states, 
The Negro has been more a formula than a human being—a 
something to be argued about, condemned or defended, 
to be “kept down,” or “in his place,” or “helped up,” to be 
worried with or worried over, harassed or patronized, a 
social bogey or a social burden. The thinking Negro even 
has been induced to share this same general attitude, to 
focus his attention on controversial issues, to see himself 
in the distorted perspective of a social problem.8
Moving to a telos of whole being and moving beyond 
a problem for white folks is how and why the reading 
of Thurman’s work is essential to contest white social 
constructions of a Black/Negro as “the problem.” Therefore, 
there is no Negro problem; there is only a problem with 
Negroes.
The telos of whole being and absolving one’s self of being 
a problem is why it cannot go without being mentioned 
that Neal’s work is an in-depth undertaking of doing the 
work of recovery and re-memory. It also creates a different 
framework for those who look at after-life9 studies to 
actively engage in countering the narrative of canonized 
figures within the movement. Because for Thurman, it is 
the philosophical teachings of his grandmother Nancy. 
Examples of the experiential as philosophy are texts that 
are often read as narratives such as the writings of Harriet 
Jacobs, Frederick Douglass, Maria Stewart, David Walker, 
Ottobah Cugoano, and Phillis Wheatley. Their experiences 
are philosophical questions that are first approached 
through contemplation and then further explored through 
the written form. The textual and inter/textual mystical 
experience that Thurman writes is why Neal reads the onto-
epistemology of Blackness in Thurman’s writings. Neal 
states, “The study of black(ness) as a type of consciousness 
or being in the world, not the color of a person’s skin, 
but that which is rooted in the experience of blackness, 
particularly in the American context, is the fundamental 
aim of my investigations.”10 As a philosopher, Neal reads 
Thurman from the perspective of the experiential instead 
of the social construction of Blackness, largely because 
Thurman bears witness to his grandmother’s accounts 
of having been enslaved. By doing so, Neal’s reading 
complicates the argument that Blackness in America begins 
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Neal’s second question is, Is there a best way for humans to 
live together? To answer this, Neal reminds us that Thurman 
read Plato’s Republic and referred to it throughout his life. 
Plato was required reading, and still is, I may add, if you 
are a student at Columbia University. The utopic structure 
of Plato’s Republic is what plants the seed of thinking as to 
what are the best ways for humans to exist amongst each 
other. Second, in the structure of a utopia, Thurman would 
be able to contemplate the state of Blackness. Third, Neal 
also notes that the mysticism in Plotinus’s revival of Plato 
would influence how Thurman would read The Republic. 
For example, Neal points out that Thurman feels that 
“Plotinus felt, taught, thought that all of life, all creation 
was in God.”20 Hence, Plotinus’s intervention of Plato’s 
work allows Thurman to see utopic formations of a society 
as being an ideal place for humanity. Just like Plato and 
Plotinus, Thurman used philosophy to work through his 
concerns about finding the best means for humans to live 
together. Is there any significance in personal experience? 
I would say in thinking through Thurman, absolutely. To not 
think through primary, secondary, or tertiary experience is 
to think from a limited and Western, Vitruvian21 perspective. 
By thinking through the complex non-monolithic elements 
of experience is to unify the self, community, and the 
cosmological from a non-Western perspective. As for 
philosophy and what it means to philosophisize is to think 
through modes of being that do not center the white gaze 
(Vitruvianism) or seeing Blackness as monolithic. It would 
also mean seeing texts and those who respond to texts as 
having continued moments of the sublime.
NOTES
1. Blanche Radford-Curry, “The Reality of Black Philosophy,” The 
Black Scholar 43, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 146–51.
2. Anthony Neal, Howard Thurman’s Philosophical Mysticism: Love 
against Fragmentation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 2019).
3. I argue that mystics such as Soren Kierkergaard, Simone Weil, 
Edith Stein, etc. speak of moments of the sublime as a moment 
bigger than humanity’s ability to measure. However, in thinking 
through Africana discourse and mysticism, the ability to read, 
interpret, and write that moment is the sublime, especially 
when Blackness and being are under constant contestation in 
opposition and overcoming whiteness.
4. The African American Intellectual History Society (AAIHS) is 
a scholarly organization that aims to foster dialogue about 
researching, writing, and teaching Black thought and culture 
through scholarship, interdisciplinarity, inclusiveness, public 
engagement, and media.
5. Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).
6. Nathalie Etoke, Melancholia Africana: The Indispensable 
Overcoming of the Black Condition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2019).
7. https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/
Historical-Data/Constitutional-Amendments-and-Legislation/
8. Alain L. Locke, “Enter the New Negro,” in The New Negro: An 
Interpretation, 1925 (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
9. Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe 12, no. 2 
(Summer 2008): 1–14.
10. Ibid., 6.
11. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Denmark, 1846).
12. Simone Weil, Waiting for God, trans. by Emma Craufurd (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1966).
13. Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (Germany, 1916); and 
Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning 
philosophers, particularly at Columbia University, were 
employing the techniques of philosophy to achieve 
solutions to the social and moral problems of their day. 
This philosophical aim was rooted in the propensity of 
the department at Columbia towards metaphysics. In 
this citadel, Thurman would be invested with the tools to 
struggle with and solve many of the issues which thwarted 
the very existence of the multitudes of blacks in the United 
States causing Thurman to refer to the bleakness of black 
existence as the Luminous Darkness.17 
If Thurman considered himself a philosopher, what did he 
consider a philosopher to be? More so, what was Howard 
Thurman thinking about especially when he defines 
Blackness as 
“the Luminous Darkness”?18 Instead of seeing Blackness 
as the absence of light, he sees Blackness as the absolute 
source of light. For Thurman and the way in which Neal 
reads his body of work, that Blackness is the sublime. 
His mysticism or textual intervention is an articulation of 
Blackness as the sublime.
Despite his personal experiences and bearing witness to 
or tertiarily absorbing those experiences of the social state 
of Blackness, Thurman does not see Blackness as bleak or 
a void but the point of illumination. That brings us to the 
question of what was Thurman thinking? Neal posits that 
Thurman was thinking of three things: 
1. What did it really mean to be human?
2. Is there a best way for humans to live together?
3. Is there any significance in personal experience? 
I will begin to answer the questions that Neal asks in his 
reading of Thurman. First, what did it really mean to be 
human? Neal himself begins with this statement:
On one level, it can be said that African American philosophy 
arises from the American moment and is rooted in the 
denial of the foundational ideal of freedom to enslaved 
African bodies, but on another level African American 
philosophy can be said to have arisen from the rejection of 
the lived experience created by slavery/oppression and an 
affirmation of the desired experience which extended from 
the minds of these black bodies as they ushered in their 
own Modern Era. 
Despite being born in 1899, which is three years after the 
Plessy v. Ferguson ruling (1896), Thurman’s personal and 
inherited legacy situates him in what Neal argues as going 
beyond philosophy as “white-only” and being the only 
“human perceptual framework(s).” Neal notes,
African American philosophy rejected the white-only as 
human perceptual frameworks. The very relevance of 
African American philosophy is derived from the context of 
slavery. Therefore for Thurman as philosopher establishes 
not only his humanity but anyone who has autonomy and 
the ability to imagine.19
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Al Frankowski: I was working on a piece thinking about 
genocide and anti-Black violence and how framing things 
in terms of genocide gives us a different way to think about 
political violence. At the same time, I was also shifting to 
thinking about architecture and spatiality and histories 
of racism spaces of violence, and places of racism. So, 
moving away from memorials, which we tend to think of 
as being located in space, but remarkably as public sites 
of memory and history, that gave me a way of thinking 
about things temporally, but I was thinking about special 
location and exploring what could be thought of in terms 
of not just pasts or history, but spatial workings of histories 
of racial violence. So I’m looking at the history of anti-Black 
racial violence as a type of architecture, as a racialized 
terror issue, that occupies that sort of space. Another way 
of thinking about the background is that I was thinking 
about spectacle terror lynching as not only continuous with 
the history of slavery, but something discontinuous with 
it. One of the things that troubles me is that when people 
talk about anti-Black violence or white supremacy in the 
United States, they talk about a sort of continual trajectory 
from slavery to Jim Crow to Mass Incarceration. There’s 
something right about that. I think that’s the right context. 
But what seemed peculiar to me was that spectacle terror 
lynching marks a different type of racialization, a different 
type of public violence than slavery. So, I’m trying to be 
attentive to those differences.
MT: To build off of that, I’ve been thinking about the 
notion of violence at work in your previous book. There’s 
a conversation happening about sensibility in which it can 
reify itself. Reading this piece, it seems that what’s at stake 
is not a particular form of historical sensibility, the issue is 
types of violence and atmospheres of violence. Where are 
you on thinking of what those forms may look like? After 
the first book, we can think about historical sensibility, 
of how post-racial sensibilities disconnect a sense of the 
violence of the past. One way to combat that would be to 
cultivate a sense of historical violence. But you seem to be 
saying something different.
AF: The memorial work tries to locate a type of present 
violence that is historicized or a historical sense of violence 
that animates why it’s important to think about a historical 
sense of violence. what post-racial memory seems to do 
is to cut in the wrong directions. It seems to historicize a 
type of violence that is still present. It specifically doesn’t 
remember exactly what it claims to be remembering. So, 
its present is one that continually reenacts certain types 
of violence. What may have gotten lost there or what I 
hadn’t anticipated and am trying to be more attentive to is 
that the spaces which we occupy are not simply cleansed 
of violence just because they’re historical. Our present 
occupation of spaces, the present experience of spaces is 
highly politicized in direct relationship to the types of racial 
violence that don’t necessarily disappear just because 
racial violence has been in its past. Lynching spaces 
are particularly prone to this. If we think architecturally, 
there are spaces in the south and north that had large 
African-American communities. Once a lynching happens, 
everyone moves out, and you have the creation of a white 
space. That’s an architectural feature of that space. So, 
what you would have currently is people who have lived 
of Being (Germany, 1936).
14. Neal, Howard Thurman’s Philosophical Mysticism, 5.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 18.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 22
20. Ibid., 32.
21. Leonardo da Vinci’s 1490 image “Vitruvian Man,” in which 
he centers man (white man) as the central being and image 
of humanity. This image is constructed two years before 
Christopher Columbus sails across the Atlantic Ocean. The image 
foreshadows Europe’s Global Conquest and the globalization of 
whiteness.
Spectacle Lynching, Sovereignty, and 
Genocide: A Dialog with Al Frankowski
Alfred Frankowski
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
Michael L. Thomas
SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY
A common refrain in the Critical Philosophy of Race is that 
Black people are always already in a context of violence. 
This refrain is mystical to those who view the history of racial 
violence as distinct from its contemporary manifestations. 
It is nonsense to those who believe that claims of violence 
are overstated and only apply to particular instances of 
physical harm. In his work in the philosophy of race, Al 
Frankowski argues that this reception is guided by forms 
of sensibility that fail to make sense of the history of 
violence in the United States and its connection to the 
violence in the present. In his first book, The Post-Racial 
Limits of Memorialization (2015), he analyzes how our 
memory of racial violence is post-racial; it disarticulates 
the violence of the present as it acknowledges the 
violence of the past. This form of sensibility reproduces a 
common public refrain around past descriptions of racial 
violence in the U.S. that it’s “about the past, but feels like 
it could be about the present.” That obscurity of feeling 
is the result of a post-racial logic that requires this form 
of sensibility to make sense of the world by making the 
connection between the present and the past insensible. 
In his recent article, “Spectacle Terror Lynching, Public 
Sovereignty, and Antiblack Genocide (2019),” Frankowski 
analyzes how spectacle terror lynching serves as a form of 
political assembly that establishes the sovereignty of anti-
Black violence as a feature of those sites. In this interview, 
I discuss this recent article with him to elaborate on its 
central concepts, discuss their connection to the sense of 
violence we currently experience, and explore the political 
potential for marking this violence as anti-Black genocide.
Michael L. Thomas: To get us started, could you give us 
some background on how this new work bridges from 
your previous book project, The Post-Racial Limits of 
Memorialization?
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MT: What does sovereignty, a concept central to your 
article, mean within that political space of assembly. What 
does it mean for that to be a white supremacist space?
AF: One thing I find problematic when looking up terror 
spectacle lynching is that public spaces seem to be 
redefining themselves politically not simply as white 
supremacist spaces. They are redefining themselves as 
they are redefining what is possible through anti-Black 
forms of assembly. If we go back to the spectator in Ellison’s 
work, the spectator is becoming something. It’s not that 
he’s radically changing his whiteness, he’s becoming 
something different. It doesn’t mean that after seeing the 
lynching he only understands himself as white supremacist. 
The lynching becomes a sort of boundary. It’s always an 
extreme. The fact of its possibility and that it operates in 
a space as something the state can’t legislate against. It 
means that the public performance is also a reconstruction 
of a sovereignty that isn’t finished or terminated in the 
lynching. It becomes real in the displacement of the people. 
It becomes real in the people who occupy those spaces 
normatively the next day, weeks later, or months later. It 
becomes real in their children. It becomes real in the way 
in which that public space is configured around that event. 
Through erasure, through downplaying it, through putting 
up markers. It becomes real after that. It becomes real for 
us in the way that it’s only a dream or a promise for the 
folks who attend the lynching. This is how Arendt talks 
about sovereignty and the general will.
MT: In the article, you trace an evolution of the idea of 
sovereignty from Rousseau, through Schmidt, to Arendt. 
What happens in that movement between the three? 
AF: For Rousseau, what is sovereign has to do with the 
question of the General Will as a type of agreement. He 
has a bare bones notion of the limit of the political. Schmitt 
rightly capitalizes on that particular point, that the General 
Will is needed by the state to understand itself politically. 
Without an expression of absolute sovereignty, don’t have 
state power, you have potential state power. Just like, 
without the absolute expression of God’s will breaking all 
of God’s own rules, you don’t have divine power of of any 
sort, you just have potential. The state has to be able to 
dispose of its people at will, for any reason or no reason at 
all in order for it to embody sovereignty. 
Schmidt means this literally, that it has to be able to send 
people off to die. Some people have to die in a war, or it 
has to dispose of them as an expression of its sovereignty. 
That has to be a real possibility. In religious terms, it has 
to be possible for your God to be able to tear you down. 
Otherwise, it’s not really a God. If God can only work to do 
the good, then I have no fear of my God, and I can’t really 
stand in awe of its power. Schmidt is working on something 
similar there. 
Arendt takes up the same notion of sovereignty between 
the two because she’s pointing out that it’s in the public 
gathering of the General Will that any sovereign action is 
never completed in the gathering. It’s always a promise at 
the same time. This doesn’t have to be for bad or for good. 
Whatever relates us, what organizes that public affect, 
in the fact of white spaces, that have been architecturally 
constructed as white spaces. Those white spaces were only 
made possible through this severe anti-Black expression 
of political violence. So it’s no longer really a question of 
what do we remember and what do we forget, it’s now a 
question of do how we live in the spaces that we occupy.
MT: You begin your article with a discussion of the narrator 
of Ellison’s “Party down in the Garden.” Particularly, in the 
narrator’s experience, there’s a tension between the public 
and the private dimensions of those spaces, which opens 
us to thinking of the public and private dimensions of 
people. In this case, it seems the spectator is an outsider 
to lynching but an insider to white supremacy, meaning 
they are foreign to our direct experience of violence, but at 
home with anti-Black violence in the U.S. Is this how you’re 
interpreting that experience?
AF: What’s complex about the Ellison character is that he’s 
clearly white and being invited into this event, where he 
becomes an insider. What strikes him as odd isn’t the 
absence of Black people or what’s happening to this 
particular person. There is a weird transformation of his 
own sensibility that is laying claim to him. So, he is not 
an outsider to white supremacy, he’s an outside to a very 
particular aestheticization that is being made public. I quote 
one of the characters who says, “there are no Christians 
here, Only Americans,” and at this point there is a dropping 
of the façade. “Let’s not fool ourselves anymore, we’re all 
here. This is what we’re here for. We’re only American.” 
There’s a sense where that’s what’s being made public. 
That’s what makes [the narrator] sick. He’s literally being 
turned inside out. But, it’s not a sickness to the violence 
being cast on the Black body. 
So there’s something interesting about the revealing of the 
political through public space. It’s a revealing that can only 
take place in that particular square. So we lose something 
when we talk about the generality of each lynching. Yes, 
they’re really highly scripted. Yes, they’re very routine. But 
each one is attached to a very particular place.
MT: So, you’re emphasizing that this is a place of public 
assembly. We tend to think of spaces is abstract terms, as 
vacuous. What role does the public play in constituting the 
space? How do we move from space as the abstract place 
where things happen and that space where this public 
gathers to mark it for itself?
AF: We think of spaces as being abstract so that we don’t 
think of them as places where the political is operative. In 
her work on assembly, Judith Butler is emphatic about the 
fact that the ability to publicly assemble is the work of the 
political. There’s no reason to believe that the places that 
we assemble and the reasons why we assemble have to 
be good or bad. But, acknowledging that spaces actually 
don’t exist unless they are potentially sites of the political is 
important for understanding why something like a protest 
or why police presence is important. Think of what’s going 
on with Walmart or college campuses where you are 
confronted with the fact that these places of assembly are 
places of the work of the pollical. What goes on there is 
also a type of working out of the political.
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carefully about practices of genocide. This is why framing 
it as genocide is necessary. It may be true that all forms 
of anti-Black violence ought to be framed as genocidal 
practices. But I’m not sure that they all establish the same 
type of genocide. 
MT: Are we thinking about genocide in its codified 
definition, or is there something more there? 
AF: There’s something more there. I don’t want to discount 
what’s been said of genocide’s legal definitions and the 
cautions about expanding the term beyond its general 
meaning. If we’re being careful about how we’re defining 
something, we have to notice that there are clear ways 
that genocide is always referring to cultural practices. 
In Limpkin, there is a way that he could not think about 
genocide without thinking about colonialism and without 
thinking about how its affected interactions between the 
colonizer and colonized and what cultural effects it’s had 
over time. He’s right up to the point of talking about it as 
being embodied in one’s affective relationship with forms 
of political violence, whether or not that entity has any real 
investment in destroying people or not. This is particularly 
in his references to Native Americans, but you also see it 
when he talks of Germany’s relationship to Africa.
I’m perfectly fine with saying there is genocide and there 
are genocidal patterns of violence. I’m also fine with saying 
you can’t have an anti-Black society and think that it’s just 
about discrimination of individual groups without also 
thinking about how that type of discrimination has coded 
in it the language of genocide. 
MT: Could you say more about the connection between 
anti-Black violence, discrimination, and the language of 
genocide? How is the language of genocide encoded in 
that language of discrimination? 
AF: If we think about colonialism as not just an abstract set 
of political relations, but one that was enabled by slavery, 
and not just slavery abstractly, but African slavery, we 
have to think about it as a practice that brings in the world 
anti-Black practices. Those practices aren’t just making 
possible a world that disadvantages Black people, it’s a 
world that is anti-Black in its most essential sense, which 
is the elimination of Black people. It’s a world in which 
Black people aren’t just a second tier, or third tier, or an 
absolute bottom, as Derrick Bell will say. It is a world that 
is antagonistic to Blackness. It has a tense relationship 
to slavery because you need the slave, but the slave is 
completely disposable. This is why I would say that there’s 
a discontinuity. Because that tension is one that is particular 
to slavery that’s lost in Jim Crow. You don’t distinctly need 
the labor of the slave, what’s needed in Jim Crow is the 
disposability of the Black body. Sovereignty is only made 
real through that particular form of anti-Blackness. So we 
can say slavery is genocide, but then we have to then 
acknowledge that Jim Crow is genocidal in a different way. 
That may tell us a lot more currently about the status of 
these various types of violence and their relationship to 
the political that we couldn’t see as genocidal without that 
difference.
is not just an act or an event, it’s also a promise that can 
be completed later on. That’s true of those revolutionary 
politics which we are much more comfortable. It’s also 
true of the white supremacy of spectacle terror lynching. 
It’s in the destruction of the Black body that we see the 
architecture of a future form of white supremacy that’s 
being made public. 
MT: This helps make sense of the example of Brandon 
McClendon, who killed in Paris, Texas after being dragged 
to death behind a car. You seem to claim that this murder 
is a lynching despite lack of a gathering or a public being 
present. There is still an extent to which lynching is more 
than the noose. What is specific about it as a form of anti-
Black violence? 
AF: It’s a form of anti-Black violence that signals a type 
of gathering that it doesn’t have to have. It doesn’t have 
to follow the same patterns. So, when people say we no 
longer lynch, well, yes and no. It depends. Maybe that’s 
not the most important question. The more important 
question we need to ask is, “What form of sovereignty are 
we continually reinscribing as a public?” 
MT: It seems that what makes lynching look exceptional to 
many people is that it is a ritualized form of violence. How 
is that ritual aspect still present? 
AF: We have to be careful about what’s embedded in 
our everyday rituals. If the public gathering is neither 
automatically good nor bad beforehand, if we pay more 
attention to how our habits are relating to types of public 
reenactments of anti-Black violence. If those haven’t 
changed, then there’s no reason to think of them differently. 
Take the example of twitter activism [where “dragging” is 
metaphorically used for publicly shaming users who post 
racist, homophobic, or other forms of violent tweets]. 
The stakes aren’t if it’s effective, the importance is what’s 
being reinscribed there. A lot of it has to do with signaling 
a public and getting them enthusiastic around a particular 
type of violence or destruction. 
MT: When we discuss the ritual aspect, there’s a habitual 
aspect, where our everyday practices reinforce what’s 
been promised to us in those spaces. There’s also a ritual 
aspect in the sense used by Durkheim and Bataille of the 
affect that holds the space together which holds that space 
together. Is that right? 
AF: Yes. Plus, if it’s a promise, then we don’t really know 
how we’re completing or moving against it. We shouldn’t 
be so confident that we know that our way of participating 
of political action is moving against that promise or working 
towards fulfilling it. When we think of our agency, various 
technologies give us a type of agency that we didn’t have 
before. How much do we know about that agency? How 
inquisitive are we about those particular methods? Those 
are all things that we should be cautiously questioning. 
What we get out of looking at terror spectacle lynching 
as a type of promise of a particular formation of public 
sovereignty as opposed to it being white supremacist 
or specifically anti-Black is that we have to think more 
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genocide are stretching the definition, we’re hitting at the 
sensual level, at what doesn’t make sense to them.
Purdue University and President Mitch 
Daniels: Confession of a Rare Creature
Leonard Harris
PURDUE UNIVERSITY
On July 5, 1852, the abolitionist Fredrick Douglas wondered 
what a July 4 celebration of American independence and 
democracy meant to America’s enslaved or freed slave 
population. Facing a new year, I wonder what the past 150 
years of my university’s Great Leaps and contributions to 
intellectual life means to me?
I can never hope to be a named or endowed chair at my 
150-year-old Research One University. I am a scholar. I am 
not an administrator nor a grantsman with a track record 
of receiving major awards from the government or private 
foundations. There is a trait that I have which guarantees I will 
not be seen as a rare creature, that is, an African American 
scholar. I am an African American scholar. This trait is 
undeniable. I have been graced with a lifetime achievement 
award for scholarship and academic leadership and awards 
for promoting American philosophy, Africana philosophy, 
and numerous recognitions bespeaking my contribution to 
literia humanitas. Seven books to my name. I may not be 
qualified to be a named or endowed chair, but I would be 
like to believe it is possible based on my merits. Others, 
whether of African, Japanese, Indian, Chinese, or of white 
heritage, have been awarded named and endowed chairs 
for scholarship. What once were termed “honorary white” 
people in apartheid South Africa, (Japanese, Koreans, 
Taiwanese, and Chinese) is a designation that eludes me: 
I am invisible in a world where the exotic ‘other’ can be 
granted status but the native, in this case, African American, 
must be a singular racial kind and fit the appropriate 
stereotypes. It is only African Americans at my university 
that must be an administrator, in addition to meritorious 
scholarship, that have been awarded a named or endowed 
position. Wealthy African American slave owners were 
occasionally treated as honorary whites in the ante-bellum 
south (Negro, but not really, a sort of honorary white for 
convince); white women slave owners were occasionally 
as vicious, ruthless and powerful as men and accorded 
special status at slave auctions or in court (women but 
not really, a sort of honorary male for convenience). If I 
were the absolute best in my field I might have a chance. 
I cannot just be great, like my white and honorary white 
colleague, I must be really rare. Sometimes I think I am 
invisible because I am not sufficiently productive. If I suffer 
from a multitude of micro-stresses that draw my mind away 
from scholarship and add to my likelihood of early onset 
high blood pressure or ulcers, none of this can be neatly 
establish and can never be compensated. My shortfall in 
productivity gains me nothing but additional invisibility. 
Even if I am not a rare creature, I am not sufficiently unique. 
Despite the fact that there are, by any count, very few 
tenured African American Professors in Philosophy (4.3 
MT: Recent footage emerged (on 9/20/19) of a Black woman 
being gang beaten by four men at a Pittsburgh gas station. 
Apparently, it started when she knocked over a display of 
chips after the owner refused to transfer her payment from 
a broken pump to a working one. The owner was not white, 
but it raised the question for me of what could animate 
that sense of violence as a legitimate form of recourse, 
particularly against the body of a woman. This seems to 
help explain that event. You’ve already presumed a certain 
sovereignty over the situation in a social order that makes 
this sovereignty possible. 
AF: These are all spatial relations, so it’s about property. 
She knocked over the chips. She’s occupying space in a 
way that makes an immanent claim. The history is almost 
irrelevant, because they’re occupying the space of rights, 
of that political sovereignty. You have to believe that 
there’s a type of relation that goes into that. It dispenses 
with the idea that they’re white supremacist, or they hate 
Black people, or they have an encoded doctrine working 
underneath everything. It’s a form of relation that is present 
when they’re able to exercise that sense of the public. 
Maybe on it’s the small scale, it’s when you’re the owner of 
a convenience store, but it’s also present at Trump rallies. 
This is why he’s accurately describing them as a movement 
of love. It’s a movement of White love, predicated on anti-
Blackness. 
MT: I explained to my wife that when I say, “it hasn’t felt this 
way for a while” during the Trump presidency, I’m referring 
to the fact that there’s an affect that’s present which had 
dampened since I was young and in Louisiana. As soon as I 
stopped moving and changing jobs to settle in a place, this 
rhetoric up, and I feel it again. There’s a present immanent 
threat that I’d thought I’d avoided. 
To conclude, why is it important to use the language of 
genocide to make these connections?
AF: The term genocide neatly reframes the way we think 
about these things so that we’re not thinking about a 
particular type of violence that is associated with the 
United States or with a particular racial relationship that 
lends itself to the language of sovereignty. You can’t really 
talk about lynching without also thinking about a practice 
deeply wedded to colonialism, not an abstract colonialism, 
but anti-Black colonialism, and not just American form, 
which would particularize it. There are the acts that form 
our colonialism globally. They are also commensurate with 
the sensibility of that colonialism.
A world in which lynching practices are possible as they 
are in our world is a world in which they make sense. It’s 
the sense of framing them as genocide that I’m trying to 
antagonize. We’re shocked by lynchings because they’re 
extreme. That’s such a mediated relationship to something 
that allows us to be shocked by lynching, and that’s how 
we make sense of it. When we start to frame it as genocide, 
that’s what antagonizes the sense that we’re making of 
them. That’s the difference of taking an aesthetic approach 
to the problem rather than the rational. We’re looking at 
what’s going on at the level of the sensate. It cuts across 
that. It’s not that people who are talking about lynching as 
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whatever other accomplishments I may achieve.
Another dollar to the university’s division responsible for 
promoting diversity will never fix the problem. Only senior 
administrators, professors, named and endowed chairs 
decide who will be named and endowed chairs. The white 
and honorary white people decide. Their decisions, for 150 
years, have been pretty predictable.
I teach a course in philosophic anthropology that features 
concepts of racism by African American and Third World 
philosophers. The authors proffer different and competing 
concepts of racism. Racism is defined by J. Garcia and 
Anthony Appiah, for example, as malicious intentions, 
ill-wills toward the well-being of others or irrational 
reasoning. Angela Davis and Tommy Curry define racism 
by social structures and ill-wills or the interplay of class and 
prejudice. I define racism as a form of necro-being. Racism, 
on my account, is a way of killing and forcing persons to 
live egregiously facing death, preventing persons from 
being born and stealing assets needed to sustain healthy 
living. Intentions are nearly completely irrelevant on this 
definition. All the definitions of racism, however, consider 
it misguided to promote undue stereotypes, especially 
by authorities that are responsible for leading all of us 
all. When the authority falters, it is not like the failure of 
persons without public personas and responsibility. Their 
failure is especially egregious. To whom much is given, 
much is expected.
The slave and freed slaves in 1852 could only hope that the 
future would be radically different than the past.
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percent in 2016), no matter how rare or accomplished, my 
kind in any field have only been awarded at my university a 
named or endowed chair if they have two jobs: in addition 
to any scholastic or academic merit, they must also be a 
senior administrator. For all the money, promotion of the 
university as a leading institution of higher learning and 
dedication to enhancing its image by the alumni of my 
university, I, nor anyone of my kind, in 150 years, have 
ever received a dime or the benefits of honors for their 
scholastic endeavors par excellence, simpliciter.
During a conversation with African American student the 
President of my university, Purdue, Mitch Daniels, on 
November 20, talked about recruiting minority faculty and 
told students that “At the end of this week, I’ll be recruiting 
one of the rarest creatures in America—a leading, I mean a 
really leading, African-American scholar.” My president has 
since apologized (December 4): “I retract and apologize for 
a figure of speech I used in a recent impromptu dialogue 
with students,” Daniels wrote in a letter sent to the NAACP, 
Purdue’s Black Caucus of Faculty and Staff, Latino Faculty/
Staff Association, the Black Student Union and the Latino 
Student Union. “My reference was in praise of a specific 
individual and the unique and exciting possibility of 
bringing that particular individual to Purdue,” Daniels 
wrote. “The word in question was l chosen and imprecise 
and, in retrospect, too capable of being misunderstood. I 
accept accountability for the poor judgment involved.”
I have every reason to believe his comment was made 
without malicious intentions and that his apology was 
sincere. So what if the president’s intentions were honorable 
and apology sincere? Unintentional consequences are 
consequences, nonetheless. The spread of stereotypes 
perpetuates harm. They cause emotional distress that too 
often influences loss of hope, depression and thereby 
increased blood pressure and onslaught of ulcers.
I wanted my picture to be on the front cover of my book, 
A Philosophy Born of Struggle: Leonard Harris Reader 
(Bloombury Publishing Company, 2020). The publishing 
company refused. After three months of arguing, and 
their willingness to compromise and put my picture on the 
back of the book, I relented. One reason they had for not 
wanting my picture on the cover was compelling: potential 
buyers would assume that a Black face meant the contents 
were for, about, and ultimately only created by an essential 
racial type, a Black being. If the cover had a white person’s 
face, buyers would assume that the contents had a 
general application and an impartial source. The marketing 
department had, in fact, done their homework. Stereotypes 
cause financial, personal and social harm. Stereotypes are 
not innocent images. Their authors are not innocent.
I teach the same number and types of courses as first year 
assistant professors in my department. I have access to 
the same support for research, travel or contribution to the 
university as other teachers. I do not get to be considered 
innocent and I do not get to be considered an exemplary 
teacher if I use degrading, demeaning or insulting 
stereotypes to characterize my students in my class when 
I use examples of ethical problems. I get reprimanded and 
I am not likely to get a substantive salary increase despite 
